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Does foreign bank entry make Chinese banks stronger? 
Abstract: 
China has encouraged its domestic banks to introduce foreign investment since the early 
2000s. In the meantime, China has gradually fulfilled its WTO accession commitment 
to give foreign banks the same treatment as their Chinese counterparts in the last decade. 
This research has examined the effects of the two modes of foreign bank entry, namely, 
minority ownership participation, and setting up branches and subsidiaries, on the 
performance of Chinese banks. Our results suggest that there is no systematically 
significant impact of the minority ownership participation on the performance indicators 
of Chinese banks. However, it appears that the physical presence of foreign banks has 
been a significant driver for domestic banks to improve profitability and efficiency. 
Opening the country to foreign banks appears to have made Chinese banks stronger and 
more competitive.  
Keywords: 
Chinese banks, foreign bank entry, minority ownership, bank performance 
JEL codes: 
G21, G28, G34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Foreign bank entry modes include establishing a wholly foreign-owned bank, opening a 
branch or representative office, entering into a joint venture with a local partner and 
acquiring an equity share in an existing bank (Hope et al., 2008). In China, the first 
three modes lead to the banks being regarded as foreign banks that are subject to the 
rules and regulations governing foreign banks. Xu (2011) and Lin (2011) have noted 
that establishing a bank branch was the main form of foreign bank presence in China. 
By the end of 2011, 37 foreign-owned banks had been set up and were operating with 
245 branches. In addition, 77 foreign banks and two joint venture banks had opened 94 
and 10 branches, respectively. However, foreign strategic investment in Chinese banks 
as another form of foreign entry has become increasingly important in the last decade. 
Before 2003, only a small number of Chinese banks were allowed to bring in foreign 
capital. However, a flood of foreign investment by overseas financial institutions flowed 
into China’s domestic banks after the Administrative Rules Governing the Equity 
Investment in Chinese Financial Institutions by Overseas Financial Institutions was 
promulgated in 2003.
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China’s banking reforms and development have received much attention in the literature 
(see, for example, Berger et al., 2009; Lin & Zhang, 2009; Xu, 2011). Lin and Zhang 
(2009) examined the effect of ownership on the performance of China’s banking 
industry for the period 1997-2004, while Xu (2011) looked at the impact of the presence 
of foreign banks on China’s banking performance for the 1999-2006 period. However, 
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 Currently, China has set upper limits for foreign ownership in domestic banks: 25 per cent for total 
foreign ownership and 20 per cent for a single foreign investor. Exceeding the 25 per cent limit will result 
in the bank being treated as a foreign bank. This rule does not apply to publicly listed banks and they will 
be regarded as domestic banks even if foreigners hold more than 25 per cent equity. So far none of the 
domestic banks have changed their Chinse identity as a result of the ownership acquisition. 
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it appears that most of the previous studies only concentrate on one type of foreign bank 
entry without controlling for the potential impact of other entry modes, which could 
cause omitted-variable bias. This study will simultaneously consider two main forms of 
foreign bank entry, namely, directly setting up branches and subsidiaries, and taking on 
minority ownership, and see if they have weakened or improved the performance of 
Chinese banks. Following previous literature, the performance indicators included in 
this study are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tier 1 capital ratio 
(TCR1), total capital ratio (TCR), and the cost to income ratio (COI). 
 
It is worth noting that most of the strategic partnerships between Chinese and foreign 
banks were established between 2004 and 2006 as shown in Table 1. Most of the 
existing studies only cover a period before or shortly after the 2004–06 acquisition wave, 
which is not long enough to reveal the full impact of the strategic partnership that took 
place in the 2000s. It is, therefore, necessary to re-examine the effects of both foreign 
equity participation and the physical presence of foreign banks using data from a period 
(2002-11) long enough to reveal the short run and long run effects. Both static and 
dynamic panel data models are employed in this study. The dynamic panel data model 
can be used to address the potential endogeneity problem associated with foreign bank 
entry which has been largely ignored in previous literature such as Lin and Zhang 
(2009).  
 
The next section summarises the potential benefits and costs of foreign bank entry. 
Section 3 presents the findings of previous research that are most relevant to this study. 
Section 4 defines the dependent and independent variables and provides the data sources. 
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Section 5 interprets the econometric results and compares our findings with those of 
previous studies. The last section articulates the policy implications. 
 
2. Potential benefits and costs of foreign bank entry 
Chen et al. (2009) summarise the potential benefits of introducing foreign capital to 
Chinese banks: improving the corporate management structure, bringing in new 
technologies, products and management skills, and increasing capital adequacy ratios. 
The uniform state-owned equity structure of the SCBs implies that the firms may have 
to serve social goals in addition to commercial performance. Martin and Parker (1997) 
contend that when state-owned firms pursue other objectives, the ability to achieve 
efficiencies is weakened. It is, therefore, not surprising that the SCBs had long been 
characterised with an overly high percentage of bad assets and low competitiveness 
(Chen et al., 2009). At the end of 2003 only eight commercial banks reached the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8 per cent, but all of the banks met this requirement 
in 2011. Another benefit of introducing foreign strategic investment is that minority 
foreign investment may serve as a quality signal to the capital market, thereby 
increasing the revenue per share in the IPO market (Berger et al., 2009). After 
introducing foreign strategic partners, three of the SCBs launched very successful IPOs 
in both Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets. It is also believed that a foreign 
strategic partner has a positive effect on a bank’s prudent behaviour and can help 
improve the accuracy and transparency of domestic banks’ financial records, thereby 
increasing global investor confidence and opening new business opportunities for 
Chinese banks. This has been evident by the speed of their network expansion around 
the world in the recent years. By the end of 2011 the Big Four and the Bank of 
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Communications had set up 105 overseas branches and had invested in 10 foreign 
companies.
2
  
 
However, there are potential problems associated with the influx of foreign capital. For 
example, foreign financial institutions tend to undervalue the value of Chinese banks 
and want to bargain a low acquisition price, sometimes even much lower than the 
market price. In addition, the introduction of foreign equity may increase the possibility 
of contagion and susceptibility to any financial crisis (Chen et al., 2009). On the last 
day of 2008, just one day after the expiry of the lock-up period during which foreign 
investors were not allowed to sell their stakes in Chinese companies, Swiss bank UBS 
AG sold its entire 1.3 per cent stake in the Bank of China for US$808 million. On 13 
January 2009 the Royal Bank of Scotland sold its 4.26 per cent equity stake in the Bank 
of China for US$2.3 billion to shore up its own balance sheet. Also in January 2009 the 
Bank of America announced that it would sell 5.6 billion of its shares in the 
Construction Bank of China, thereby reducing its stake in this bank from 19.13 per cent 
to 16.6 per cent. The exodus of foreign investors during the 2008–09 global financial 
crisis led to a drop of the share price of these banks and posed a risk to China’s financial 
system. 
 
Although the number of branches of foreign banks in China has almost doubled since 
the relaxation of foreign bank entry in the early 2000s under the WTO commitments, 
foreign banking assets remain a small percentage of China’s total banking assets: the 
1.93 per cent in 2011 was only a slight rise from the 1.84 per cent in 2004. Nevertheless, 
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 The “Big Four” refers to the four largest banks by market share within China: the Bank of China (BOC), 
the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). 
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Xu (2011) notes that foreign banks are experienced in trade finance and foreign 
exchange business, which enables them to provide sophisticated banking services to 
their Chinese clients. This will pose a competitive threat to the domestic banks and 
force them to be innovative and to improve customer services. Even though most of the 
foreign banks are concentrated in a few capital cities, apart from head-to-head 
competition in those cities, they also pose a threat to their Chinese counterparts whose 
pricing and lending behaviour in other parts of China will be constrained by the 
potential entry of foreign banks there. In response to this, Chinse banks have already 
taken action to deal with the problems of non-performing loans and low capital 
adequacy and have begun to restructure their internal organisation and decision-making 
processes (He & Fan, 2004). 
 
The relatively low market share commanded by foreign banks at this stage implies that 
domestic banks have not been under any serious threat. However, concerns remain. He 
and Fan (2004) warn that in the face of competition from foreign banks, the response by 
Chinese banks may widen the development gap between regions, as the banks may shift 
away from less developed areas and increasingly focus on market niches that are 
regarded as more lucrative, which means that some areas will be under-serviced. 
Foreign banks are unlikely to step in to this banking service vacuum as they tend to 
“cherry pick” the most profitable domestic markets and customers, which will increase 
the overall riskiness of the domestic banks’ portfolios (Mathieson & Roldos, 2001). In 
addition, due to the close link between foreign banks and their parent banks, funding 
shocks to the parent banks can be transmitted to their subsidiaries in China, especially 
during the period of financial crisis. This may lead to a reduction in lending, posing a 
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risk to the stability of the financial system. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) report that 
lending by multinational bank subsidiaries in European transition economies is sensitive 
to profitability changes in other subsidiaries of the parent bank. During the global 
financial crisis, foreign subsidiaries reduced their lending earlier and faster than did 
domestic banks (De Haas et al., 2011). 
 
3. Related studies on the effects of foreign bank entry on domestic banks 
Berger et al. (2009) analyse the profit and cost efficiency of 38 Chinese banks over 
1994–2003. They find that the Big Four banks were the least efficient and that minority 
foreign ownership was associated with significantly improved efficiency, implying that 
the reduction in state ownership of banks in China was the right reform. Using a panel 
of Chinese banks over the 1997–2004 period, Lin and Zhang (2009) find that state 
ownership is negatively related to bank performance with the Big Four banks having the 
worst accounting ratios, thus providing some support for ongoing bank ownership 
reform in China. Hasan and Xie (2012) acknowledge that at this stage the ownership 
shares of foreign strategic investors are relatively small and their management 
involvement is minimal. However, their findings suggest that foreign minority 
investment exerts a positive effect on banks’ prudent behaviour through an improved 
corporate governance system. In their event study analysis, a positive market reaction to 
foreign strategic investment announcements was observed. It also appears that, due to 
limited ownership involvement, foreign banks had less of a contagion effect on Chinese 
banks during the global financial crisis. 
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However, Jiang et al. (2012) find no evidence that foreign minority ownership in 
domestic banks improved performance over the 1995–2008 period. One possible reason 
is that after foreign owners take minority ownership, it is the domestic banks that 
undertake most of the investing activities such as upgrading technology and applying 
prudential practices such as more loan loss provision. This will undoubtedly sacrifice 
profitability in the short term but may benefit the banks in the long term. In addition, it 
takes time for the domestic banks to adapt to the managerial and operational skills 
brought about by the new strategic partners. Shen et al. (2009) present similar findings, 
that is, foreign bank penetration measured by the percentage of foreign investment 
affects neither profitability nor costs. The authors argue that after allowing foreign 
investors to participate in Chinese banks, the local banks might invest in training staff to 
enhance their human capital or increase their investment in computer programs and 
equipment to use cutting-edge technologies, both of which result in increased costs and 
revenues. Cultural differences and different strategic goals as well as the lack of 
employees who are fluent in English and who are familiar with international affairs 
might create additional obstacles that have a negative impact on the cooperation 
between Chinese banks and their foreign investors. Other countries have had similar 
experiences. By examining the impact of changes in bank governance on bank 
performance for a sample of commercial banks operating in South East Asia between 
1990 and 2003, Williams and Nguyen (2005) admit that there is not a clear conclusion 
concerning foreign acquisition – although banks taken over by foreign institutions have 
improved profit efficiency performance, their productivity performance is not amongst 
the strongest. The authors agree that the benefits of foreign governance will take a long 
time to be realised. 
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Regarding the presence of foreign banks in domestic markets, Denizer (2000) finds that 
foreign banks have the effect of reducing overhead expenses and the return on assets of 
the domestic banks in Turkey, indicating that even if small in scale, foreign bank entry 
tends to put competitive pressure on the domestic banks. In a comprehensive study 
covering 80 countries, Claessens et al. (2001) claim that the increased presence of 
foreign banks is associated with a reduction in profitability and margins for domestic 
banks. Lensink and Hermes (2003) find that at lower levels of economic development, 
foreign bank entry is related to increasing costs and margins for domestic banks, while 
at higher levels of development costs, the relationship is less clear. Xu (2011) reveals 
that the presence of foreign banks in China has a positive relationship with the non-
interest income, and a negative relationship with the net interest margins of domestic 
banks. In addition, an increased foreign bank presence is associated with an increase in 
costs for domestic banks. 
 
It appears that the effect of foreign bank entry on the performance of domestic banks is 
not clear-cut. The use of various performance measures and control variables in 
different studies may also explain the variation in the findings. This research will 
contribute to the ongoing debate on this issue by examining the effects of foreign 
ownership participation in Chinese banks, and setting up braches and subsidiaries in 
China, respectively.  
 
4. Methodology and data 
4.1 Measuring performance 
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Following previous literature such as Lin and Zhang (2009), the performance variables 
used as dependent variables include ROA and ROE. However, Bonin et al. (2005) warn 
that measures of bank performance in transition countries are sensitive to the strategies 
used to write off bad loans. They are also easy to manipulate. Therefore, we also 
consider capital adequacy ratios, including TCR1 and TCR, which were a significant 
consideration when the banks sought strategic partners. TCR1 is defined as the ratio of a 
bank’s core equity capital to its total risk-weighted assets. TCR is determined by 
dividing total capital by risk-weighted assets. Previous literature suggests that a high 
level of state ownership is associated with high operating cost and low efficiency 
(Bonin et al. 1998), while foreign bank entry tends to reduce overheads and to improve 
efficiency (Xu 2011). We thus include the cost to COI as a dependent variable to 
approximate bank efficiency and to see if the introduction of foreign ownership has 
improved cost efficiency. 
 
4.2 Measuring foreign bank entry 
We attempt to measure the foreign bank entry variable in several ways. We use both the 
percentage of foreign investment and dummy variables to account for the presence of 
foreign investors. However, it is understood that it may take time for the Chinese banks 
to improve their performance. Therefore, we include a dummy that takes the value of 1 
immediately after the introduction of foreign partners and a dummy that takes the value 
of 1 three years after the foreign ownership participation. We call the two dummies 
“foreign ownership dummy” and “long run dummy”, respectively, in the following 
sections. 
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Setting up a foreign-owned bank or opening a branch is another form of entry to China 
for foreign banks. The presence of foreign banks in China is most likely to have 
promoted competition, forcing their domestic counterparts to cut costs and to provide 
better services. Therefore, we include the number of branches of foreign banks, 
including joint venture banks, in our models. This variable is denoted as foreign 
branches in the tables.  
 
4.3 Control variables 
We control for macroeconomic variables and bank specific characteristics. The 
macroeconomic variables include the annual GDP growth rate and the inflation rate.
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Individual banks, total assets in logarithmic form are used as an independent variable to 
represent the size of the bank. A dummy variable is included if a bank is publicly listed 
in the stock market (public listing dummy). Lin and Zhang (2009) claim that newly 
established banks are more profitable and more efficient than the SCBs. We thus 
include a dummy variable for the Big Four. 
 
Following Berger et al. (2005) and Lin and Zhang (2009), we identify the banks that did 
not experience any change in ownership over the sample period and create a dummy 
variable (no ownership change dummy) for these banks taking the value of 1 for all time 
periods. 
 
4.4 The data 
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 We have attempted to include more bank type dummies in the models such as the dummies denoting 
banks that operate at the national level with and without foreign investment participation. Unfortunately, 
none of them are statistically significant. 
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Our sample consists of unbalanced annual data, including observations from 2002 to 
2011 for 39 banks. Although we tried many different sources, the data for some periods 
were not available for some banks. The policy banks created by the government are not 
included as they are not-for-profit organisations. The sample includes 11 national level 
banks, including the Big Four, and 28 provincial and city-level banks. Thirteen of the 39 
banks were without foreign ownership participation, including one of the Big Four (the 
Agricultural Bank of China). The 26 banks that have had foreign ownership 
participation are listed in Table 1. It should be acknowledged that most of the provincial 
and city-level banks have set up branches in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai 
and their business is not just confined to their province or city. The data for these 
performance variables come from various sources which include Bankscope, China’s 
Wind Information and the banks’ annual financial reports. The macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP growth and inflation can be found in the China Statistical 
Database compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
Table 1: Banks contained in the sample that have introduced overseas strategic 
partners. 
 Chinese domestic banks Acquisition time Overseas investors 
Foreign 
investment 
percentage 
1 China Everbright Bank 1996.1 Asian Development Bank 3.29% 
2 Bank of Shanghai 
1999.12 International Finance Corporation  7.00% 
2001.12 
HSBC 8.00% 
Shanghai Commercial Bank(Hong 
Kong) 
3.00% 
3 Bank of Nanjing 
2001.11 International Finance Corporation 15.00% 
2005.12 BNP Paribas 19.20% 
4 
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank 
2002.12 Citibank 4.62% 
5 Bank of Xi’an 2002.9 
International Finance Corporation、
Scotiabank (Canada) 
24.90% 
6 Industrial Bank 2003.12 Hang Seng Bank (Hong Kong) 15.98% 
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Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation 
5.00% 
International Finance Corporation 4.00% 
7 Bank of Communications 2004.8 HSBC 19.90% 
8 Qilu Bank 
2004.11 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 11.00% 
2009.6 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 9.00% 
9 China Mingsheng Banking 
2003.9 International Finance Corporation 1.22% 
2004.11 Temasek Holdings (Singapore) 4.55% 
10 Shenzhen Development Bank 2004.12 Newbridge Capital (USA) 17.89% 
11 Hangzhou Commercial Bank 2005.4 Commonwealth Bank of Australia 19.90% 
12 China Construction Bank 
2005.6 Bank of America 9.10% 
2005.7 Temasek Holdings (Singapore) 5.10% 
13 Bank of China 
2005.12 Royal Bank of Scotland  10.00% 
2005.8 Temasek Holdings 5.00% 
2005.9 United Bank of Switzerland AG  1.61% 
2005.1 Asian Development Bank 0.24% 
14 Bank of Beijing 2005.9 
ING (Netherlands) 19.90% 
International Finance Corporation 5.00% 
15 Hua Xia Bank 2005.9 Deutsche Bank 14.00% 
16 Bohai Bank 2004.12 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong 
Kong) 
19.99% 
17 
Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China 
2005.8 
Goldman Sachs, Allianz Group, 
American Express 
10.00% 
18 Tianjin Bank 2005.12 
Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group 
20.00% 
19 Bank of Ningbo 2006.1 Oversea-Chinese Bank (Singapore) 12.20% 
20 China Guangfa Bank 2006.11 Citibank 20.00% 
21 China CITIC Bank 
2006.11 BBVA Group (Spain) 5.00% 
2009.2 BBVA Group 10.07% 
22 
Shanghai Rural Commercial 
Bank 
2006.11 
Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group 
19.99% 
23 
Chongqing City Commercial 
Bank 
2006.12 Carlyle, Dah Sing Banking Group 24.99% 
24 Bank of Qingdao 2007.7 Intesa Sanpaolo (Italy) 19.99% 
25 Bank of Chengdu 2007.11 Hong Leong Bank (Malaysia) 19.99% 
26 Xiamen Bank 2008.12 Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) 19.99% 
Sources：Bankscope, and Banks’official websites. 
Some literature has argued that ownership could be endogenous as investors may be 
attracted by the banks’ good performance (Gugler & Weigland, 2003). However, Barry 
et al. (2011) show that the ownership endogeneity problem is not a major issue in their 
study. Liang et al. (2013) pointed out that many reforms that took place within a 
Chinese bank were guided and required by the regulatory authorities. This might be also 
the case for the change in ownership for most of the banks in our sample, which 
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suggests that the endogeneity problem associated with the ownership variable is not 
very serious. Therefore, we first treat ownership as exogenous and use the traditional 
random and fixed effects models (static models). We then use the dynamic panel data 
estimation technique to address the potential endogeneity problem by using the lagged 
values of the ownership variable as instruments. The inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable allows to capture the fact that a firm performance in the previous period may 
have a strong impact on its performance in the current period. Ignoring the past trend 
tends to overstate the effects of other variables. The system GMM approach, proposed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), is used for the dynamic 
panel data model. 
 
An examination of the data suggests that the foreign bank branch variable has an 
upward trend and the COI shows a slight downward trend. Other performance 
variables do not exhibit an obvious trend.
4
 A spurious correlation could arise between 
two trending variables. Including a time trend could solve this problem. Wooldridge 
(2006) pointed out that even if only the independent variable grows over time and the 
dependent variable has no noticeable trend,  including a trend in the regression can 
improve the precision of the model. Therefore, a time trend variable is included in all 
the models.    
 
 
5. Results and discussion 
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 The trend patterns for these variables are not reported here for lack of space, but are available upon 
request.  
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Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the financial performance measures and 
other variables. The average ROA and ROE for the Chinese banks for the period 1993–
2002 reported in Fu and Heffernan (2009) were 0.9 per cent and 16.2 per cent, 
respectively. Our sample reports a mean of 0.75 per cent for ROA and an average ROE 
of 13.9 per cent for the 2002–11 period. Compared to the means of the five dependent 
variables, the values of their standard deviation are relatively large, indicating that the 
performance variables vary significantly across banks and over years. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.  
 ROA 
(%) 
ROE 
(%) 
TCR1 
(%) 
TCR 
(%) 
 
COI 
(%) 
Foreign 
investment 
(%) 
Total assets 
(RMB 
million) 
All banks 
Obs. 317 319 242 270 324 390 328 
mean 0.75 13.90 9.05 10.89 44.74 7.09 1 145 909 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.48 16.12 4.82 4.86 15.37 9.30 2 479 854  
Min. -1.39 -193.9 -1.50 -1.50 23.49 0 5 121  
Max. 3 83.46 62.60 62.60 169.87 25 15 500 000 
Banks with foreign equity 
Obs. 146 146 146 151 154 166 155 
mean 0.85 14.10 9.49 11.49 38.99 16.67 1 740 833 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.44 20.42 5.68 5.59 12.95 6.58 3 096 166 
Min. -1.39 -193.90 -1.50 -1.50 23.49 3.30 15 338 
Max. 2.23 41.13 62.60 62.60 169.87 25 15 500 000 
Banks without foreign equity 
Obs. 171 173 96 119 170  173 
mean 0.66 13.74 8.39 10.14 48.87  612 884 
Std. 
Dev. 
0.5 11.36 3.02 3.62 15.92  1 582 335 
Min. -0.97 -23.55 0.75 1.45 25.10  5 121 
Max. 3 83.46 16.35 24.30 95  10 000 000 
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Publicly listed banks 
Obs. 75 75 80 82 82 90 82 
mean 0.95 17.66 9.14 11.80 37.45 10.82 3 067 983  
Std. 
Dev. 
0.36 5.26 3.21 3.22 6.05 8.42 3 862 036 
Min. 0.14 4.18 2.30 2.30 23.49 0 75 511  
Max. 1.58 31.17 20.70 24.10 57.03 24.90 15 500 000 
 
 
The pair-wise correlations among independent variables were calculated to check if 
there exists potential multicollinearity problem. High pair-wise correlations among 
regressors, say, in excess of 0.8, may indicate a multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 
2003). An examination of the correlation matrix does not suggest the presence of 
multicollinearity, as most of the bivariate correlations are not more than 0.5 with the 
highest being only 0.67. However, it should be noted that this is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition, because sometimes even if the pair-wise correlations among 
regressors are low, a multicollinearity problem may still exist. Therefore, a collinearity 
diagnostic test was subsequently conducted on all the independent variables as an 
additional test for the presence of multicollinearity. A variance-inflating factor (VIF)) 
can be used to detect multicollinearity. A rule of thumb states that a value of VIF of an 
independent variable greater than 10 indicates possible collinearity between this 
variable with other regressors (Gujarati, 2003). Again, no serious multicollinearity 
problem has been found. The results of the tests can be provided upon request.   
 
For the static model, a Hausman test can be used to see whether the random effects 
model or the fixed effects model is preferred. The Hausman test compares the 
differences of the fixed and random effects with the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
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estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated 
by the consistent fixed effects estimator. The random effects model makes full use of 
the information provided by cross-sectional and time series data, and is thus more 
efficient if the explanatory variables are not correlated with the unobserved effects. If 
the Hausman test prefers a fixed effects model, we also report the results of the random 
model in Tables 3 and 4. To accommodate the potential serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity problem, robust standard errors are reported. The results of the 
dynamic models were reported in Table 5.  The lagged ROE of a previous period has no 
significant effect and so the results for the performance indicator ROE are not reported 
in Table 5. 
 
The results from the static and dynamic models are largely consistent. Foreign 
ownership participation, regardless of being measured by the foreign ownership 
dummy, the long run dummy or by the percentage of foreign investment, is not 
significantly and positively associated with the ROA or the ROE at the 5 per cent level. 
Instead, the coefficient of the long run dummy in Table 3 shows that three years after 
the introduction of foreign strategic partners, the ROA was significantly lower at the 5 
per cent level after other factors were controlled for. In addition, the foreign ownership 
dummy has a negative impact on the ROE at the 10 per cent level as shown by the 
random effects model. These results generated from the data for 2002 to 2011 are 
consistent with the findings in Jiang et al. (2012) whose datasets cover the 1995–2008 
period. They provide some explanations for this unexpected result. For example, banks 
may pursue long-term benefits at the cost of sacrificing short-term profitability. 
However, the negative coefficient of the long run dummy in this study may imply that 
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the strategic partners had limited or no influence over the banks’ operations in 
improving their long term profitability probably because of the 25 per cent upper limit 
on foreign ownership participation. It is also possible that, as minority owners, foreign 
investors do not have a strong incentive to introduce advanced technologies, new 
products and suitable corporate governance mechanisms to the domestic banks (Shen et 
al., 2009). 
 
One intention of introducing foreign strategic investors is to increase the banks’ capital 
adequacy ratio. Table 4 shows that the percentage of foreign investment has a positive 
impact on both TCR1 and TCR at the 10 per cent significance level. However, Table 3 
suggests that in the long term, the TCR1 would be significantly lower for those banks 
that have had foreign ownership participation. We have not found any significant effects 
of the presence of foreign investment on COI, a measure for cost efficiency. 
 
It is noteworthy that the number foreign bank branches has a consistent and significant 
impact on the performance measures with expected signs except for the TCR1 variable 
in Tables 3 and 4. The dynamic models also suggest that foreign bank entry in this form 
is positively associated with ROA and TCR.  It appears that the direct competition of 
foreign banks has made Chinese banks more profitable and more cost efficient. This 
finding has important implication as it supports the policy of opening the banking sector 
to foreign banks, which might lead to Chinese banks becoming more competitive. 
Although it has been argued that introducing foreign capital to Chinese banks would 
improve corporate management structures and bring in new technologies, products and 
management skills, it appears that foreign bank entry in the form of establishing 
19 
 
19 
 
branches would be a more powerful force for the domestic banks to change than 
minority ownership participation. In fact, in today’s global and information era, it is not 
difficult to adopt new technologies and to recruit people with high management skills. 
The physical presence of foreign banks in China changes the market structure, which 
could be more effective in driving their Chinese counterparts to be innovative and to 
adopt new technologies and skills. This is consistent with the structure–conduct–
performance paradigm which suggests that the structure of a market influences the 
conduct of the firms that operate in it, and in turn this conduct influences the 
performance of those firms. This paradigm shows that market structure can be altered in 
order to achieve a desired outcome with improved conduct and performance (Sosnick, 
1958). 
 
It can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 that the banks that have gone public have 
significantly better TCR1 at the 1 per cent significance level. Not surprisingly, better 
macroeconomic conditions measured by the GDP growth rate could help the banks to 
improve the COI. Higher inflation rates have similar effects as shown in Tables 3-5. 
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the SCBs had significantly higher TCR1 and TCR, which 
may partly demonstrate the success of the series of reforms implemented on the Big 
Four in the past decades.  
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Table 3: Regression results using dummies to measure the change of ownership. 
 ROA  
(fixed 
effects) 
ROA  
(random 
effects) 
ROE  
(fixed 
effects) 
ROE 
(random 
effects) 
TCR1 
(random 
effects) 
TCR 
(random 
effects) 
COI 
(random 
effects) 
Foreign 
ownership 
dummy 
0.026 
(0.083) 
0.018 
(0.078) 
-2.782 
(2.301) 
-5.950 
(3.308)* 
2.417 
(1.190)** 
2.007 
(1.184)* 
-2.166 
(2.660) 
Long run 
dummy 
-0.186 
(0.058)*** 
-0.171 
(0.053)*** 
-1.312 
(2.083) 
-1.658 
(2.851) 
-2.140 
(0.611)*** 
-1.627 
(0.709)** 
3.556 
(1.801)* 
No ownership 
change 
 0.041 
(0.082) 
 -4.264 
(3.816) 
-0.330 
(1.004) 
-0.040 
(1.108) 
0.179 
(4.180) 
Public listing 
dummy 
-0.042 
(0.065) 
0.028 
(0.054) 
-0.990 
(5.691) 
3.264 
(3.146) 
1.064 
(0.684) 
1.881 
(0.623)*** 
3.687 
(2.159)* 
GDP growth 0.019 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
0.563 
(0.423) 
0.516 
(0.402) 
0.188 
(0.152) 
0.101 
(0.184) 
-1.481 
(0.382)*** 
Inflation 0.024 
(0.009)** 
0.025 
(0.009)*** 
0.503 
(0.375) 
0.576 
(0.400) 
-0.024 
(0.079) 
-0.010 
(0.091) 
-0.725 
(0.169)*** 
Time trend -0.017 
(0.032) 
-0.212 
(0.030)   
-2.211 
(2.089) 
-2.147 
(1.832) 
0.114 
(0.482) 
-0.149 
(0.466) 
-0.911 
(1.050) 
Foreign 
branches(FD) 
0.007 
(0.001)*** 
0.006 
(0.001)*** 
0.188 
(0.094)* 
0.175 
(0.099)* 
0.033 
(0.021) 
0.046 
(0.022)** 
-0.091 
(0.040)** 
Big Four 
dummy 
 0.105 
(0.148) 
 -3.648 
(4.537) 
4.642 
(2.164)** 
3.831 
(2.187)* 
2.229 
(5.931) 
Log asset -0.019 
(0.057) 
0.014 
(0.028) 
-0.700 
(1.108) 
0.339 
(0.993) 
-1.325 
(0.682)* 
-1.156 
(0.682)* 
-1.882 
(1.956) 
Constant -0.888 
(0.717) 
-1.213 
(0.443)*** 
-18.836 
(21.903) 
-24.693 
(13.952) 
12.309 
(10.184) 
11.225 
(10.329) 
112.203 
(26.773*** 
Observations 315 315 317 317 242 269 322 
***significant at 1% ; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
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Table 4: Regression results using the percentage of foreign investments to measure the presence of foreign ownership. 
 ROA  
(fixed 
effects) 
ROA  
(random 
effects) 
ROE 
(fixed 
effects) 
ROE 
(random 
effects) 
TCR1 
(random 
effects) 
TCR1 
(fixed 
effects) 
TCR 
(random 
effects) 
COI 
(fixed 
effects) 
COI 
(random 
effects) 
Foreign 
investment (%) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.086 
(0.144) 
-0.073 
(0.128) 
0.094 
(0.048)** 
0.125 
(0.061)** 
0.082 
(0.053) 
-0.146 
(0.128) 
-0.140 
(0.125) 
No ownership 
change 
 0.061 
(0.083) 
 -1.669 
(2.980) 
-0.126 
(1.009) 
 0.078 
(1.065) 
 
 
-0.596 
(4.254) 
Public listing 
dummy 
-0.088 
(0.060) 
0.023 
(0.054) 
-2.039 
(5.650) 
3.131 
(3.378) 
1.295 
(0.748)* 
0.371 
(0.660) 
2.020 
(0.702)*** 
6.898 
(2.353)*** 
3.942 
(2.214)* 
GDP growth 0.023 
(0.014)  
0.018 
(0.014) 
0.597 
(0.418) 
-0.317 
(0.420) 
0.237 
(0.154) 
0.250 
(0.171) 
0.114 
(0.214) 
-1.693 
(0.389)*** 
-1.563 
(0.389)*** 
Inflation 0.025 
(0.009)*** 
0.026 
(0.009)*** 
0.582 
(0.433) 
0.168 
(0.427) 
-0.010 
(0.072) 
-0.013 
(0.084) 
0.004 
(0.086) 
-0.729 
(0.181)*** 
-0.750 
(0.1174)*** 
Time trend -0.017 
(0.032) 
-0.021 
(0.031) 
-2.239 
(2.079) 
-2,114 
(1.745) 
0.039 
(0.471) 
   -0.793 
(1.051) 
Foreign 
branches  
0.006 
(0.001)*** 
0.006 
(0.001)*** 
0.185 
(0.091)** 
0.160 
(0.089)* 
0.029 
(0.021) 
0.041 
(0.019)** 
0.044 
(0.021)** 
-0.095 
(0.042)** 
-0.086 
(0.041)** 
Big Four 
dummy 
 0.142 
(0.140) 
 -1.297 
(5.953) 
4.883 
(2.054)** 
 3.930 
(2.060)* 
 1.216 
(5.871) 
Log asset -0.035 
(0.059) 
0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.914 
(1.148) 
-0.304 
(1.400) 
-1.380 
(0.666)** 
-2.631 
(2.246) 
-1.154 
(0.652)* 
-0.741 
(3.480) 
-1.661 
(1.967) 
Constant -0.671 
(0.742) 
-1.038 
(0.443) 
-15.768 
(21.670) 
-15.318 
(12.553) 
13.590 
(9.812) 
26.798 
(22.772) 
11.324 
(9.657)* 
102.069 
(41.387)** 
109.882 
(26.946)*** 
Observations 315 315 317 317 242 242 269 322 322 
***significant at 1% ; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
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Table 5: Regression results using system GMM approach. 
 ROA  
(one-step) 
ROA  
(one-step) 
TCR1 
(one-step) 
TCR1 
(one-step) 
TCR 
(one-step) 
TCR 
(one-step) 
COI 
(one-step) 
COI 
(one-step) 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.356 
(0.125)*** 
0.415 
(0.134)*** 
0.365 
(0.140)*** 
0.365 
(0.091)*** 
0.315 
(0.134)** 
0.264 
(0.090)*** 
0.468 
(0.060)*** 
0.447 
(0.059)*** 
Foreign ownership 
dummy 
0.151 
(0.099) 
 0.329 
(2.109) 
 2.128 
(2.032) 
 -2.528 
(2.314) 
 
Long run dummy -0.121 
(0.061)** 
 -1.234 
(0.649)* 
 -0.409 
(0.452) 
 0.486 
(1.248) 
 
Foreign investment 
(%) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.014 
(0.082) 
 0.010 
(0.057) 
 -0.053 
(0.085) 
No ownership change 0.106 
(0.081) 
0.076 
(0.071) 
0.322 
(1.542) 
-0.349 
(1.198) 
1.573 
(1.471) 
0.322 
(0.937) 
-0.956 
(2.204) 
-0.196 
(1.985) 
Public listing dummy 0.054 
(0.058) 
0.049 
(0.054) 
0.363 
(0.484) 
0.486 
(0.492) 
0.699 
(0.640) 
0.779 
(0.654) 
-0.991 
(1.085) 
-1.124 
(1.169) 
GDP growth 0.015 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.049 
(0.119) 
0.056 
(0.115) 
0.020 
(0.134) 
0.076 
(0.119) 
-0.895 
(0.316)*** 
-0.972 
(0.309)*** 
Inflation 0.036 
(0.012)*** 
0.037 
(0.013)*** 
0.071 
(0.053) 
0.073 
(0.052) 
0.120 
(0.062)* 
0.113 
(0.059)* 
-0.780 
(0.131)*** 
-0.770 
(0.131)*** 
Time trend -0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
0.028 
(0.197) 
0.001 
(0.218) 
0.080 
(0.171) 
-0.093 
(0.188) 
-2.027 
(0.519)*** 
-2.025 
(0.523)*** 
Foreign branches 0.003 
(0.001)** 
0.003 
(0.001)** 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
0.023 
(0.010)** 
0.026 
(0.011)** 
0.041 
(0.028) 
0.037 
(0.023) 
Big Four dummy 0.134 
(0.111) 
0.125 
(0.102) 
1.554 
(0.968) 
1.797 
(0.840)** 
2.083 
(1.091)* 
1.702 
(0.026)** 
-1.965 
(2.108) 
-1.431 
(2.186) 
Log asset -0.019 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.281 
(0.204) 
-0.402 
(0.170)** 
-0.378 
(0.274) 
-0.289 
(0.203) 
0.514 
(0.480) 
0.338 
(0.482) 
Constant -0.448 
(0.308) 
-0.471 
(0.296) 
3.442 
(3.021) 
5.717 
(2.820)** 
3.823 
(3.699) 
3.361 
(3.138) 
30.452 
(9.230)*** 
34.433 
(9.472) 
Observations 275 275 195 195 223 223 281 281 
Number of instruments  64 49 62 47 64 49 64 49 
AR(1) test -2.30** -2.26** -2.24** -2.74*** -2.38** -2.56** -2.91*** -2.88*** 
AR(2) test 0.77 0.85 -1.09 -1.61 -0.05 -0.59 -1.17 -1.24 
 Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%; The Hansen-Sargan tests in GMM estimations confirm that the 
selection of instruments is appropriate. 
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6. Conclusion and policy implication 
Since the early 2000s, China has encouraged its domestic banks to introduce foreign investment in a 
bid to build a more stable and stronger banking system. Consequently, more than 30 Chinese banks 
have invited foreign strategic investors, most of whom are world leading banks. In the meantime, 
China has gradually fulfilled its WTO accession commitment to open its domestic market to foreign 
banks. This research has examined the effects of the two modes of foreign bank entry, namely, 
minority ownership participation and setting up branches and subsidiaries, on the performance of 
Chinese banks. Our results show that although foreign banks are concentrated in a few capital cities 
with relatively small market share, their impact on the domestic banking performance is significant 
and encouraging. The increasing number of foreign banks in China is positively associated with 
higher ROA, ROE, and TCR, and negatively related to COI for domestic banks, suggesting that the 
presence of foreign banks could be a significant driver for domestic banks to improve profitability 
and efficiency. Opening the country to foreign banks has made Chinese banks stronger. This sends 
a strong message to the policy makers that Chinese banks could benefit from the entry of foreign 
banks, and that creating entry barriers and operational restrictions to protect domestic banks is 
unnecessary. 
 
However, our results suggest that there is no symmetrically significant impact of the minority 
ownership participation on the performance indicators of Chinese banks. Instead, in the long term, 
the banks that have introduced foreign investment could have lower ROA and TCR1. It is highly 
possible that minority ownership participation does not give the strategic partners a strong incentive 
to bring in advanced technologies, skills and new products. Policy makers could consider relaxing 
foreign ownership restrictions. At the least, this research shows that a higher percentage of foreign 
investment has a positive effect on capital adequacy ratios for banks in China. 
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